, these schemes provide the ultimate layer of income protection for those in need. They are the most evident expression of a societal commitment that all individuals are entitled to a dignified existence and that no one should experience unwanted need.
For the sake of clarity, minimum income schemes can be defined as schemes that provide a financial safety-net for individuals whose personal/household income is below the national social minimum. Because of their subsidiary nature, minimum income schemes are only available to individuals who (with some exceptions, such as family benefits) are no longer eligible for other forms of income protection. Unlike categorical social assistance, minimum income schemes are (quasi)universal, that is, they are not targeted at particular groups or social risks (Eardley et al, 1996a, p 28) . Unlike social insurance, which provides insurancebased protection against (work-related) social risks, such as unemployment, old age or illness, minimum income schemes are a non-contributory form of protection (Lødemel and Schulte, 1992, pp 8-9) . Currently, this serves to identify a number of schemes in Europe (see Table 1 .1).
minimum income schemes and the provision of a safety-net in europe
There have been a number of attempts to map the differences in the provision of a minimum income in Europe.
1 The most comprehensive of these studies was carried out by Eardley et al (1996a) , which identified five different clusters in the provision of social assistance in Europe (Eardley et al, 1996a, p 165) (see Table 1 .2).
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Despite its relevance, this study provides little information on the role of minimum income schemes in the broader framework of welfare provision. In light of this, it might be helpful to overlap it with the welfare state typology proposed by Ferrera and colleagues (2000) . 3 Looking at aspects such as risk coverage and eligibility, the structure of benefits, the financing mechanisms and the organisational arrangements in place, the authors identify four welfare state models: the Scandinavian model, the Anglo-Saxon model, the Continental model and the South European model (Ferrera et al, 2000, pp 15-19 ) (see Table 1 .3, page 10).
As can be seen in Table 1 .3, in the Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon models, minimum income schemes occupy a very specific and consistent function in the overall model of welfare provision. In the Scandinavian model -which includes Sweden, Denmark and Finland -social security provides quasi-universal risk coverage and very generous social benefits. There is also a strong emphasis on active labour market policies (ALMP) and public social services (namely, childcare), with the purpose of increasing participation in the labour market. In light of this, minimum income schemes play only a marginal role in welfare provision. In addition, there is a significant level of local discretion in the delivery of the schemes, as implementation is the responsibility of local municipalities (Eardley et al, 1996a, pp 168-71; Ferrera et al, 2000, pp 15-19) .
The Anglo-Saxon model is characterised by significant gaps in entitlement to social insurance. With the exception of healthcare, there is no universal coverage of social risks. Inactive people and those earning below a given threshold are not entitled to National Insurance benefits. In turn, there is a fairly integrated safety-net which, in light of the gaps in social insurance, covers a significant percentage of the population (see Eardley et al, 1996a, pp 168-71; Ferrera et al, 2000, pp 21-6) .
There are significant differences in the provision of a minimum income guarantee in Continental countries. With the exception of the Netherlands, where some universal basic pensions schemes have been introduced, all these countries link the funding and delivery of social protection to the work status of individuals. Given its occupational basis, the social insurance system provides inclusive, but fragmented, coverage. Although, by and large, benefits are fairly generous, the relevance of minimum income schemes in the provision of social protection varies significantly. For instance, in the Netherlands and Austria, these schemes play a residual role in the protection of people in need. However, while in the former the right to minimum income protection is well established, in the latter this is subject to significant discretion by local authorities. In Germany, on the other hand, the social assistance scheme provides an integrated safety-net for those who trickle down the social security benefit structure. In France, Belgium and Luxembourg the provision of a safety-net to those in need is achieved through a (quasi)universal minimum income scheme, which is complemented by a number of targeted non-contributory schemes (Eardley et al, 1996a, pp 168-71; Ferrera et al, 2000, pp 26-31) .
The Southern European model deserves special attention, as there have been significant changes in the provision of a minimum income since the study developed by Eardley et al (1996a Eardley et al ( , 1996b was published. Before 1996, partly due to the significant reliance on the family in the provision of welfare, there were significant gaps in the framework of social protection in Southern European countries. Below the network of insurance-based income protection schemes, there was no unified safety-net to protect those in need. Only older people or those with disabilities were entitled to minimum income protection. In parallel, there was a number of discretionary programmes run by municipalities or charities (Eardley et al, 1996a, pp 168-71; Ferrera et al, 2000, pp 31-7 Matsaganis et al, 2003) . To a certain point, this reinforces the similarities of the model of social protection in these countries to that adopted in the Continental model of social protection.
From safety-net to trampoline
While originally focused on the provision of income security to those in need, the past two decades have been marked by a number of reforms that changed the mission and objectives of minimum income schemes in Europe. Although one cannot ignore the influence of the political debates and policy developments from across the Atlantic, the main factor that triggered this process was the substantial increase of unemployment. As Figure 1 .1 illustrates, one of the consequences of this was the increase of the number of people depending on minimum income benefits, in particular between 1980 and 1990 . However, as Ferrera and Rhodes show (2000 , the increase in trade competition (which compelled governments to reduce the tax burden on business), the integration of financial markets (which forced governments to focus on the stability of inflation and interest rates), and the growing weight of healthcare and pensions systems in social expenditure, limited the ability of national governments to engage in expansionary policies to reduce unemployment and welfare caseloads. In light of this, there was a demand from different quarters for the need to activate minimum income recipients as a means to improve the employment effectiveness of income support schemes. For instance, the OECD's (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) Jobs Study initiative, published in 1992, advocated that long-term assistance benefits should be made conditional on participation in active labour market programmes (OECD, 1994, pp 38-9) . In the same year, the European Council suggested that, in order to improve the reintegration capacity of minimum income schemes, the right to a minimum income should be made conditional on a work requirement for able-bodied people. At the same time, member states were encouraged to offer training courses to help recipients return to the labour market (European Council, 1992, p 3) .
In this context, a number of EU member countries introduced reforms aimed at activating minimum income recipients. In 1995 the UK government introduced the Jobseekers Act, which made the receipt of benefit dependent on searching, and accepting, available jobs. Later, the government introduced New Deal programmes that provided work and training opportunities for unemployed people (Trickey and Walker, 2001, pp 186-92) . In Sweden, the new Social Service Act of 1998 established that the right to social assistance for individuals aged between 20 and 24 was conditional on their participation in local labour market programmes or local activity programmes (see Salonen and Johansson, 1999, pp 11-12) . In Denmark, the law that regulated the provision of social assistance was amended in 1991 in order to compel municipalities to provide unemployed recipients under the age of 25 with advice and activation offers, such as subsidised job training, employment projects or education courses. This law was amended in 1993 in order to extend the activation offer to individuals above the age of 25 (Torfing, 1999, p 16 ). In 1998, the Act of Active Social Policy introduced a right and duty to activation. This meant the obligation to accept a suitable work offer, as defined by local authorities, or to participate in activation programmes (Rosdahl and Weise, 2001, p 167) .
Finally, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy introduced minimum income schemes where the right to a minimum income was made conditional on individuals' willingness to engage in an insertion process, which could encompass active jobsearch, participation in education/training courses, participation in community programmes, and so on (Capucha, 1998, pp 30, 36-42; Enjolras et al, 2001, pp 50-2; Matsaganis et al, 2003, p 646) .
As can be seen, these reforms imply a substantial change in the nature and objectives of minimum income schemes. First, the right to a minimum income was made conditional on the recipients' willingness to work or to participate in activation programmes. Entitlement to a minimum income was no longer dependent on lack of monetary resources alone, but on a visible commitment to engage in a process that would lead the recipient to become self-sufficient. Second, there is a greater emphasis on the reintegrative function of minimum income schemes. As Robert Henry Cox adequately puts its, the safety-net is replaced by a trampoline (1998, p 5) . This implied greater attention on services offered to recipients with the view of assisting them back into the labour market.
activating minimum income recipients
In order to fully understand the impact of activation on the role and nature of minimum income schemes, it is necessary to look more closely at how this has been implemented. But first, it is necessary to clarify precisely what activation means. Unfortunately, there are significant problems to this. First of all, the literature on this topic is populated by a number of overlapping concepts such as workfare (Lødemel and Trickey, 2001), welfare-to-work (Evans, 2001) , ALMP (Martin, 1998) or the work approach (Hvinden, 1994) , which make it difficult to define the conceptual frontiers of the notion of activation.
Second, and most importantly, there is little agreement as to the precise meaning of activation. For instance, according to Hanesh and Baltzer (2001) , activation refers to '… a set of policies/measures/instruments aimed at integrating unemployed social assistance recipients into the labour market and improving their economic and social inclusion' (Hanesh and Baltzer, 2001, p 3). As the authors point out, activation involves a number of policy instruments -such as legislation, financial incentives and social or labour market services -that intervene in both the supply and demand sides of the labour market.
Hvinden (1999), on the other hand, sees activation as a set of policies aimed at reintegrating unemployed people in the labour market. He goes on to distinguish between a narrow and a wider approach to activation. The first refers to a set of policies that seek to promote participation in the primary labour market through increased job-search assistance, training and education, or job creation programmes. The second is focused on the personal development of individuals and involves participation in a wider set of activities such as protected labour markets, voluntary or community activities (Hvinden, 1999, p 28) .
To a certain extent, this lack of consensus can be explained by the fact that the concept of activation has diverse meanings in different areas of public policy. For instance, in the employment area, activation refers to a more personalised treatment of jobseekers and the introduction of in-work benefits. In socio-cultural work, on the other hand, activation refers to a set of techniques and methodologies -which encompass reducing personal feelings of inferiority and insecurity, helping to establish individual objectives and to assume personal and social responsibilities -aimed at empowering individuals (Geldof, 1999, p 16) .
In addition to this, there is significant variation in how activation has been implemented. For instance, while in most countries, the focus tends to be on a (more or less) swift return of minimum income recipients to the labour market, and off welfare, in France and Portugal, labour market integration is seen as only part of a broader strategy to promote the social insertion of minimum income recipients (see Guibentif and Bouget, 1997, pp 14-18) .
Also, whereas in the majority of countries the option is to combine income support with a block of services and programmes designed to help recipients to return to the labour market, in other countries-in what Lødemel and Trickey call 'work instead of benefit policies' (2001, p xv) -the option is to replace the right to minimum income protection by the right to participate in a job creation scheme that provides individuals with an adequate level of income (see Guibentif and Bouget, 1997, pp 14-18; van Berkel and Møller, 2002, p. 50) . A good example of this is France, where individuals aged under 25, with no children, are not entitled to Revenu Minimum d'Insertion (RMI), but are eligible to participate in Emploi Jeunes (Jobs For The Young), a programme that creates real-wage 'social utility activity' jobs that can last for up to five years (Enjolras et al, 2001, pp 61-64) Reflecting on the previous paragraphs it is possible to identify what are the core issues that should be taken in consideration while circumscribing the notion of activation. Firstly, we need to determine what the main objective of activation is.
As seen earlier, the ultimate purpose of activation is to help recipients to become self-sufficient, and therefore to get them out of welfare. Although some countries (such as France or Portugal) adopt a broader understanding of how this can be accomplish, the common assumption underlying activation policies is that paid employment is the most effective way by which individuals can become selfsufficient.
Second, as the comparison between the conceptions put forward by Hanesh and Baltzer (2001) and Hvinden (1999) highlights, we need to identify which group(s) is (are) targeted by activation. Here we should clarify that, although the same policy can be applied to those receiving other types of income support (such as, unemployment or disability benefits), activation here applies only to (able-bodied) persons receiving minimum income benefits. Another issue that needs to be clarified, concerns the impact of activation on the individual's right to a minimum income. As seen earlier, activation involves a redefinition of the terms in which the right to a minimum income is defined. This entitlement is no longer dependent on the individuals' financial need alone, but also on their commitment to take the necessary actions to achieve their self-sufficiency.
Finally, as Hanesh and Baltzer (2001) conception of activation suggests, we need to circumscribe the policy instruments/tools used in the activation of minimum income recipients. As mentioned earlier, activation involves interventions in both the demand and the supply side of the labour market (Hanesh and Baltzer, 2001, p 3). However, more than identifying the type of intervention, the relevant question here is to access the nature of those interventions. As Guibentif and Bouget rightly put it, activation involves both negative and positive incentives (1997, pp 14-16) . Therefore, activation cannot be solely identified by the introduction of work requirements and sanctions. It also incorporates a number of services, work and training opportunities designed to help individuals to become self-sufficient.
With this in mind, we can define activation as a policy of combining negative and positive incentives with the purpose of helping minimum income recipients to become self-sufficient through paid employment. However, if this conceptual exercise is to be successful, it is not sufficient to state the concept of activation that will be used throughout this book. This should be further confronted with two of the most relevant neighbouring concepts in the literature: workfare 5 and ALMP.
According to Lødemel and Trickey (2001) , workfare refers to 'programmes or schemes that require people to work in return for social assistance benefits' (2001, p 6). As with activation, workfare is primarily about work. The purpose is that individuals become self-sufficient through (unsubsidised) paid employment or, if that is not possible, they participate in public work schemes in exchange for benefit (see Lødemel and Trickey, 2001, pp 8-9) .
There are, nonetheless, some noticeable differences. First of all, the notion of workfare is geographically and historically bounded. It reverts to the introduction of work requirements into social assistance schemes in the United States, in the early 1970s (Hvinden, 1999, pp 28-9) . Another difference lies in the fact that, although the 1996 reforms have introduced a broader range of work and training programmes for social assistance recipients -in what Nathan (1983) describes as 'new-style workfare' (see see Lødemel and Trickey, 2001 , pp 4) -workfare, with its focus on work requirements, sanctions and time limits, has a fundamentally compulsive nature. This contradicts the focus on the combination of positive and negative incentives characteristic of activation (see Lødemel and Trickey, 2001, pp 7-8) .
In the same way, this notion of activation should not be confused with the concept of ALMP. This notion is generally used to identify a series of labour market programmes that are aimed at the reduction of unemployment or other structural imbalnces in the labour market, such as promoting the labour market participation of women, promoting equal opportunities for people with disabilities or the economic recovery of specific regions or industries (Hvinden, 1999, pp 28-9; Kildal, 2000, p 5) . In this sense, ALMP are part of the policy-mix used in the activation of minimum income. However, as they have no implication on the rules that define the entitlement to minimum income, ALMP cannot be confused with activation as a policy concept.
The conceptual clarification of the notion of activation cannot be completed without specifying how this concept treats programmes based on a 'work instead of benefit' approach. Bearing in mind that the explicit link between activation and the right to a minimum income, the notion of activation cannot cover those situations where the right to a minimum income is replaced by the right to participate in some kind of job creation programme.
Activation tools
As mentioned earlier, activation involves the use of positive and negative incentives. However, as Hanesh and Baltzer point out (2001, p 4), we should bear in mind that these incentives can be targeted at both the demand and the supply side of the labour market. In light of this, we can map the different activation incentives in the following way (see Table 1 .3).
The introduction of activation requirements is a key component in the activation of minimum income recipients. As seen earlier, this activation requirement is expressed in two distinct formulae. In the first, which is the most common, the main purpose of activation is to find a job. The activation requirement is expressed as an obligation of active job-search, or mandatory enrolment in public employment services. Although this is mandatory to all able-bodied individuals, countries do consider some exceptions for individuals with childcare responsibilities, or with dependent adults in the family. In the second formula, the social insertion model, the main objective is to engage recipients in a multi-level strategy that is intended to reverse their situation. In this sense, the search for a job has the same priority as recovering from health problems, finding suitable accommodation, and so on (Guibentif and Bouget, 1997, pp 14-18) .
